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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH
Appellant
vs.
Case No. 20040491-CA
WAYNE A. MOWER
Appellee.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Appellant has appealed from the trial court's grant of Appellee's motion to
dismiss the charge of issuing a bad check, a Third Degree Felony, in
violation of Utah Code Section 76-6-50-(2) and this Court has jurisdiction to
hear this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section 78-2a-3 (2002).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF
REVIEW
As conceded by the State in its brief, the sole issue on appeal is
whether the trial court erred in granting defendant's timely motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim under the provisions of Utah Code 76-6-505(2).
Contrary to the State's misstatement of the facts, the question before the
Court is whether a person who conditionally issues a check to an individual

and informs the individual that the check will not be funded until the
conditions are met, is criminally liable when a third party credit union cashes
the check without verifying with the issuer's bank whether funds were
available on the check.
A trial court's ruling on a motion to dismiss is a question of law and is
reviewed for correctness, with no particular deference to the trial court's
legal conclusions. State v. Taylor 884 P.2d 1293, 1296 (Utah App. 1994)
The Appellate courts review questions of statutory interpretation for
correctness. State v. McKinnon, 51 P.3d 729 (Utah App. 2002).

CONSTUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
There are no constitutional issues being challenged and no rules.
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-505 Issuing a bad check or draft — Presumption.

(1) Any person who issues or passes a check or draft for the payment of
money, for the purpose of obtaining from any person, firm, partnership, or
corporation, any money, property, or other thing of value or paying for any
services, wages, salary, labor, or rent, knowing it will not be paid by the
drawee and payment is refused by the drawee, is guilty of issuing a bad
check or draft.
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For purposes of this subsection, a person who issues a check or draft for
which payment is refused by the drawee is presumed to know the check or
draft would not be paid if he had no account with the drawee at the time of
issue.
(2) Any person who issues or passes a check or draft for the payment of
money, for the purpose of obtaining from any person, firm, partnership, or
corporation, any money, property, or other thing of value or paying for any
services, wages, salary, labor, or rent, payment of which check or draft is
legally refused by the drawee, is guilty of issuing a bad check or draft if he
fails to make good and actual payment to the payee in the amount of the
refused check or draft within 14 days of his receiving actual notice of the
check or draffs nonpayment.
(3) An offense of issuing a bad check or draft shall be punished as
follows:
(a) If the check or draft or series of checks or drafts made or drawn in this
state within a period not exceeding six months amounts to a sum that is less
than $300, the offense is a class B misdemeanor.
(b) If the check or draft or checks or drafts made or drawn in this state
within a period not exceeding six months amounts to a sum that is or
exceeds $300 but is less than $1,000, the offense is a class A misdemeanor.
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(c) If the check or draft or checks or drafts made or drawn in this state
within a period not exceeding six months amounts to a sum that is or
exceeds $1,000 but is less than $5,000, the offense is a felony of the third
degree.
(d) If the check or draft or checks or drafts made or drawn in this state
within a period not exceeding six months amounts to a sum that is or
exceeds $5,000, the offense is a second degree felony.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with one count of issuing a bad check, waived
a preliminary hearing and filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that under the
principals enunciated in State v. Green, 672 P.2d 400 (Utah 1983), a
defendant could not be criminally liable for the issuance of a bad check if
the defendant did not receive anything for the issuance of the check and
therefore the statutory requirement that the check be issued "for the purpose
of obtaining . . . a thing of value" was not fulfilled. The trial court granted
the motion on the grounds that under UCS 76-5-505(2) defendant possessed
no criminal intent and the statute provided no criminal liability where
defendant "did not obtain or intend to obtain something of value with a bad
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check." (See Findings of Fact Conclusions of Law Re: Defendants Motion to
Dismiss page 3-page 6)
STATEMENT OF FACTS
(All references to the Transcript of the Hearing on Motion to Dismiss)
Facts were stipulated by the State and Defense.
1. On or about June 12, 2002, defendant, Wayne A. Mower, who
operates a title loan business in which persons place the title to automobiles
as security for short term loans, was approached by one Nick Kirkman
(Kirkman) for a loan of $4,900 secured by an automobile title. (Tp pg 7_
2. Defendant informed Kirkman that he would loan the $4,900.00
provided that Kirkman delivered to him the title to a specific automobile
discussed by the parties.(Tp pg 7)
3. Defendant then gave Kirkman a check for $4,900.00 based upon
previous business dealings of the parties in which defendant prepared a
check for Kirkman and then Kirkman immediately delivered the title to
defendant. (Tp pg 7)
4. Defendant informed Kirkham and Kirkman was aware that the
check for $4,900.00 would not be funded by defendant and that the check
was not to be cashed or otherwise negotiated by Kirkman until the
automobile title was delivered to defendant. (Tp pg 7)
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5. Kirkman did not deliver the title to defendant that day or at any
time thereafter and defendant has never received anything of value from
Kirkman regarding the check issued by defendant to Kirkman for $4,900.00.
(Tp pg 8)
6. Kirkman took the check for $4,900.00 and deposited the check
into his account at Weber State Credit Union without informing defendant
that he was undertaking such action. Kirkman received the total amount of
the $4,900.00 from the check. (Tp pg. 9)
7. Defendant did not make the check to Kirkman good as he did not
receive any automobile title from Kirkman, nor did he receive any loan
payments or anything else of value from Kirkman or any other party
regarding the check for $4,900.00. (Tp pg 9)
8. The check from defendant to Kirkman was not honored by
Mower's bank. (Tp pg 12-13)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court properly interpreted the provisions of Utah Code 76-6505 and applied the principles delineated in State v. Green, supra. To this
case and correctly determined that no crime had been committed. The State
laboriously attempts to create a crime in this instance where no criminal
intent, act or occurrence is present.

The State's fatal flaw is their failure to

6

note that defendant received nothing of value for the issuance of the check in
question.
ARGUMENT
THE DISTRICT PROPERLY INTERPRETED UTAH CODE 766-505 AND PROPERLY APPLIED EXISTING LAW WHICH IS
CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS.
Defendant issued a conditional check to Kirkham in which it was
clearly spelled out to Kirkham, similar to their previous business dealings,
that defendant would fund the loan when the title to the subject automobile
was delivered to defendant. Defendant issued a check which was purposely
not funded and would not be funded until the collateral was received, the
collateral was not received and there was no funding of the check.
Defendant never had any intent to deceive. Defendant never received
any "money, property or other thing of value" from Kirkham and therefore
cannot be guilty of issuing a bad check, there being no intent and no value
received.
While the State completely discounts State vs. Greenjswpra, it is still
good law and is controlling in this case. In Green, Mr. and Mrs. Green
purchased from United Savings (United) a $10,000 six month money market
certificate with a check written on it insufficient funds. On the day following
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the Greens returned to the bank and asked to cancel or close the certificate.
United refused to cancel the certificate until the Greens paid a six-month
penalty on the interest. After some discussion the Greens left the bank
without resolving the matter. The check given by the Greens to United did
not clear the Greens bank because as Mr. Green testified he did not receive
an anticipated payment. Green testified that he had sufficient funds and
other accounts to cover the amount, but in the interim decided not to follow
through on the purchase of the CD and therefore did not cover the check.
United felt otherwise and pursued criminal charges under Utah Code §76-6505 and the Greens were convicted of passing a bad check.
On appeal the Utah Supreme Court reversed the conviction stating
that "the undisputed evidence is that the Defendant did not write the check
for the purposes of obtaining from United any money, property or other
thing of value belonging to United. It was not intended by either United or
the Defendant that United would give him anything for the check "Id. at
401." United did not part with anything of value which it owned when it
issued the certificate.

It only failed to acquire Defendants account and

deposit in its institution. Under these circumstances it can not be said that
the Defendant issued its check for the purposes of obtaining any money,
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property or thing of value from United and therefore an essential element of
the crime was missing "Id. at 402."
This case is significantly similar to State vs. Green, supra

The

Defendant issued a check to Krikman which was in the form of a loan. The
Defendant did not issue the check for the purpose of receiving any money
from Kirkman, but rather for the purpose of giving the money to Kirkman
after Kirkman delivered an automobile title to the Defendant to secure the
loan. Kirkman never delivered the title to the loan and therefore Defendant
did not fund the loan. Defendant never had any intent or expectation of
receiving anything from Kirkman except the repayment of the loan.
However, Kirkman was also aware through prior business experience with
the Defendant and from Defendants explicit instructions that the loan would
not be funded until the condition precedent, that is, the delivery of the
automobile title was satisfied. The automobile title was not delivered, the
loan was not funded, and the Defendant received nothing from Kirkman.
Defendant did not receive the payment of money, property anything of
value, services, wages, salary, labor or rent or any other thing of value from
Kirkman let alone from the Weber State University Credit Union, the
ultimate repository of the check and the institution that actually issued the
funds to Kirkman. Thus, as stated in Green, an essential element required
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for conviction under §76-6-505 is missing and therefore the trial courts'
dismissal of the case was appropriate.

CONCLUSION
The decision of the trial court should be upheld and sustained as a correct
application of the law to the facts and the trial court's order of dismissal
should be affirmed.
DATED this 28th day of February, 2005.
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